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POLICE PRIVACY IN THE IPHONE ERA?:
THE NEED FOR SAFEGUARDS IN STATE
WIRETAPPING STATUTES TO PRESERVE
THE CIVILIAN'S RIGHT TO RECORD
PUBLIC POLICE ACTIVITY
BY JESSE HARLAN ALDERMAN*
ABSTRACT: The advent of iPhones, Blackberries, and other
ubiquitous cellular devices instantly capable of capturing audio and
video recordings has led to increased publicity ofpolice misconduct, and
a rise in the admission of evidence, inculpatory and exculpatory,
gathered by "citizen journalists, " ordinary bystanders, or victims
themselves. The probative value of such "iPhone evidence" and its
public utility in exposing police abuses cannot be understated. However,
a handful of states have criminalized the mere gathering of such videos
under state wiretapping statutes that prohibit a broad range of
nonconsensual recording, even of police officers in their public
capacities. This Article argues that the right of citizens to openly or
surreptitiously record police performing their public duties, without fear
of punitive and retaliatory prosecution, must be expressly safeguarded in
state wiretapping statutes. This protection is rooted in background
principles of the Fourth Amendment, which militate against conferral of
privacy rights for public police actions; the First Amendment, which
protects the right of the public to receive information and concomitantly
the right to record police; and other salient public policy considerations.
A Table of State Authorities, summarizing the relevant characteristics of
all state wiretapping laws, and the federal counterpart, is also provided
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cum laude, Tufts University, M.S., Columbia University Graduate School of
Journalism, and J.D., summa cum laude, Boston College Law School. Member
State Bar of Massachusetts. Thanks to Mary Rose Papandrea for her helpful
suggestions and guidance.
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INTRODUCTION
The cell phone videos are chilling to watch. It's New Year's
night, after the calendar turned to 2009, and the grainy images show Bay
Area Rapid Transit police officers responding to a fight on an Oakland
subway platform. All of a sudden, Officer Johannes Mehserle pins 22-
year-old Oscar Grant face down against the ground, draws his gun, and
fires. Grant died instantly. The passengers watching from an idling train,
in turns, scream, cry, or stand motionless in disbelief. Mehserle was
swiftly charged with murder.
In the age of the iPhone, where most Americans carry at least
one mobile device capable of recording audio and video with the click of
button, it was little surprise that the passengers captured the footage on
cell phones equipped with digital video cameras and audio-recording
capability. Nor is it hard to believe that the videos instantly appeared on
YouTube and social media websites. What is surprising, if not shocking,
however, is that in a handful of states, the videos might never see the
inside of a courtroom, suppressed beneath state wiretapping statutes that
prohibit a broad range of nonconsensual recording, even of police
officers in their public capacities. In fact, in a few states, the "citizen
journalists" who documented the murder would be the ones charged with
felonies. The crime: violating the personal privacy of an officer on public
duty.
Most state wiretapping laws are written or construed to exclude
recordation of police in the fulfillment of their public duties, or, at
minimum, exempt from criminal penalty the type of public activity
recorded in the Oscar Grant killing. But some states such as
Massachusetts and Illinois punish much non-consensual recording and
even confer personal privacy rights to police officers in public, as
oxymoronic as it sounds. In these states, the video recordings of the
Oscar Grant murder, shot anonymously from behind the tinted windows
of a train car, might not only be inadmissible evidence; they also might
be the fruit of a criminal act.
1. See Demian Bulwa, Wyatt Buchanan & Matthew Yi, Behind murder charge
against BART ex-officer, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 15, 2009, at Al, available at 2009
WLNR 773018.
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This Article argues that the right of citizens to record police
officers performing their public duties, without fear of punitive and
retaliatory prosecution, must be expressly safeguarded in state
wiretapping statutes. Part I provides discussion of the disparate elements
of state wiretapping statutes, explains the components of the relevant
federal law, and discusses controlling state and federal jurisprudence. A
Table of State Authorities, summarizing the relevant characteristics of all
state wiretapping laws, and the federal counterpart, is provided at
Appendix 1. Part II argues for a broad statutory exception for the
recordation of police in the public fulfillment of their duties, whether
taped openly or surreptitiously. The arguments in Part 1I stem from
background principles of the Fourth Amendment, which militate against
conferral of privacy rights for public police actions; the First
Amendment, which protects the right of the public to receive information
and concomitantly the right to record police; and other public policy
considerations.
I. STATE & FEDERAL WIRETAPPING LAWS CONTROLLING RECORDATION
OF PUBLIC POLICE ACTIVITY
An examination of the wiretapping statutes and their subsequent
judicial interpretations in state courts and the federal circuits reveals a
mosaic of inconsistency and disagreement.2 Every state except Vermont,
as well as the U.S. Congress, has adopted a statute criminalizing some
forms of nonconsensual interception of oral communications by use of
electronic recording devices.4 However, the manifold state laws, and
2. Carol M. Bast, What's Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of
the Law ofEavesdropping, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 837, 840 (1998). This Article uses the
term "wiretapping" broadly to describe statutes that prohibit non-consensual
recording, eavesdropping, or other activity beyond pure wiretapping, that is,
intercepting communications from a telephonic or other electronic cable.
3. While Vermont has never passed a wiretapping or eavesdropping statute, the
Vermont Supreme Court has held that the state constitution's privacy provision
protects individuals from certain types of wiretapping or illicit recordation. See VT.
CONST. ch. 1, art. 11; infra Table of State Authorities, at app. 1.
4. Id.; see also THE REPORTERS COMMITrEE TO PROTECT FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO TAPING PHONE CALLS AND IN-PERSON
CONVERSATIONS IN THE 50 STATES AND D.C. (2008), available at
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
their federal counterpart, often depart from one another based on three
critical distinctions: (1) whether criminal punishment requires a
surreptitious or otherwise concealed recording or whether open recording
is still prohibited; (2) whether the consent of one party to the
conversation, typically the recording party, insulates the recorder from
criminal liability or whether the interception remains illicit absent the
consent of all parties to the communication; and (3) whether the statute's
penalties apply when the party recorded owns no "reasonable expectation
of privacy" or is otherwise exempted by virtue of the party's status as a
public official or police officer.
This Part will analyze controlling Supreme Court decisions that
have broadly informed state wiretapping statutes and jurisprudence, the
federal wiretapping statute, and several exemplary state statutes,
including one-party and all-party consent statutes that include and
exclude reasonable expectation of privacy exceptions. This Part also
examines relevant state court interpretations, finding police officers in
the course of their public duties either fit within the privacy protections
offered by the controlling wiretap laws, or, as this Article argues is
necessary to fulfill important constitutional and public policy objectives,
fall outside the scope of those statutes.
A. Federal Law
Supreme Court pronouncements of an individual privacy right
against nonconsensual wiretapping, and subsequent federal laws
6
memorializing that recognition, are of relatively recent vintage. Prior to
http://www.rcfp.org/taping . With some nuance, all state, and the federal wiretapping
laws only punish recording of oral or wire communications, which would include
videotaping by means of a camera, cellular phone, or other device with any audio
capability. See e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(1)-(2), (C) (2010). Many
states also criminalize nonconsensual videotaping where the subject of the video
demonstrates a reasonable expectation of privacy. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 3-
901-903 (West 2010) (classifying as a criminal misdemeanor any use of a hidden
camera in a bathroom or dressing room or on private property "to conduct deliberate
surreptitious observation of an individual" or in a private place with prurient intent).
5. See infra Sections I.A.-1.C.
6. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
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1967, private persons and federal and state law enforcement agencies
routinely deployed electronic surveillance devices to record
conversations, without judicial supervision or even breaking the law.7 In
the 1928 case Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld
against constitutional challenge the right of police to wiretap the home
telephone of a criminal suspect where the police made no physical
trespass upon a proprietary interest of the defendant.
However, nearly four decades later, the Warren Court overruled
Olmstead, holding in Katz v. United States that individuals own a
personal privacy right in their conversations and that right need not be
tethered to any cognizable property interest. 9 Justice Stewart, writing for
the Court, reasoned that the Fourth Amendmento protects "people, not
places," and even in some public settings, such as a phone booth,
individuals do not forfeit the protection of the Constitution's prohibition
on unwarranted wiretapping."
7. See Bast, supra note 2, at 840.
8. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. The police were able to record the telephone by
placing electronic taps on the telephone wires outside the home. Id. at 457. In 1952,
the Court once again upheld a Fourth Amendment challenge to evidence obtained
without a warrant when a police informant wore a microphone under his shirt, which
transmitted the conversation to Narcotics Bureau agents. On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952). In Lopez v. United States, the Court affirmed the
admissibility of evidence obtained, without a warrant, by an officer who used a
pocket recorder to secretly tape a conversation with the defendant. 373 U.S. 427, 440
(1963).
9. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. In Katz, FBI agents attached a listening device to a
public phone booth where the defendant discussed his involvement with an interstate
betting ring. Id. at 348.
10. Unwarranted wiretapping, it was argued, offended the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee of freedom from "unreasonable searches and seizures." See
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
11. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
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Katz's most enduring legacy, however, is found in Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion, which established a two-tiered test for
constitutional protection of personal conversations.12 The test required
"first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.""' Notably, Justice Harlan's two-pronged
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test has since become the
"touchstone" of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.14 In the intervening
years, the Court has interpreted Harlan's test in such a way to
dramatically retreat from the rather broad Fourth Amendment protections
suggested by the Katz majority.'5 As examples, the Court has affirmed
the admissibility of evidence, over Fourth Amendment objections, where
police observed or recorded defendants, without a search warrant, by
entering open fields on private property, flying a helicopter over a private
home, and rooting through garbage. In all cases, the Court held that the
defendants could not invoke the Fourth Amendment where analysis
under the objective prong of Justice Harlan's test failed to demonstrate a
privacy expectation "society is willing to accept . . . as reasonable."
12. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Bast, supra note 2, at 842
(stating that Harlan's concurrence "eclipsed the majority opinion as precedent").
13. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
14. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz, 389
U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)) "The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis
is whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy."' Id.
15. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding under prong
two of Harlan's test that society is not willing to recognize as reasonable a privacy
expectation in trash because trash is affirmatively exposed to the public for
municipal pick-up and susceptible to observation by "snoops"); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at
213 (deciding that police do not have to "shield their eyes" when observing illegal
conduct as passersby or when surveilling property from public airspace); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (holding under prong two that expectation
of privacy in open fields is not one that "society recognizes as reasonable" because
open fields can be casually entered or surveyed by police).
16. See, e.g., Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213; Oliver, 466
U.S. at 179 (finding no protected 4th Amendment right in garbage, airspace
surveillance, or open fields).
17. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207. See also Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields).
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One year after Katz, Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), using Justice
Harlan's concurrence as the template for codification of the Court's
newly minted personal privacy right against illicit wiretapping. Title III
proscribes the interception and disclosure of any oral, wire, or electronic
communication, unless the recorder is a party to the communication, or
one party to the communication offers prior consent. Thus, Title III is a
one-party consent statute.20 The definition of "oral communication"
mimics the language of Justice Harlan's concurrence, and, as such,
courts have interpreted Title III to punish interception of spoken
communications only where the recorded party demonstrated an
objective and subjective expectation of privacy.21 Title III provides
18. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351 Stat. 197
codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2008); see also PRISCILLA M.
REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY
9 (1995) (writing "[t]his law was passed largely in response to the Supreme Court
ruling Katz v. United States and because of congressional interest in organized
crime") (citation omitted).
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(l)(a) (proscription of unauthorized interception); §
251 1(1)(c) (proscription of disclosure); § 2511(2)(d). Section 2511(2)(d) states:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not
acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where such person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent . . . unless such
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing
any criminal or tortious act ....
Id. Title Ill defines "intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of
any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical or other device." Id. at § 2510(4).
20. Id. at §§ 2511(2)(c)-(d). It is important to note that Title Ill, like most state
laws only punishes interception of oral communication, so mere video surveillance
without capturing any audio sound is not criminalized. See Derrick Nunnally,
Specter Wants to Extend U.S. Privacy Curbs to Web-cam Use, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Mar. 30, 2010, at Bl (Senator Arlen Specter proposed amending Title Ill to punish
video interception, without sound, after school officials in a Philadelphia suburb
were caught monitoring students with web cameras secretly installed on school-
issued laptop computers).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (defining "oral communication" as statements "uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation"); see United States v.
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procedural steps for law enforcement officers to obtain court orders to
wiretap suspects of certain enumerated offenses and prohibits the
admissibility of communications obtained in contravention of the Act.22
The penalty for illegal interception of oral communications is a
maximum five years in prison, and the Act also creates a civil remedy for
23
aggrieved parties.
At least one federal court has addressed, albeit obliquely, the
question of whether police officers in the public performance of their
duties enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy, such that their oral
communications qualify for Title III's safeguards against non-consensual
24
wiretapping. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit appeared
eager to answer in the negative.25 In Angel v. Williams, officers in Webb
City, Missouri, who beat a prison inmate were fired after an electronic
26
device surreptitiously recorded the incident. In dismissing their civil
complaint, brought under the private cause of action created by Title III,
the court held that communications "between police officers and a
prisoner" recorded "in a public jail" do not enjoy an objective
expectation of privacy.27 The court's treatment of the issue is terse but
likely reflects recognition that both the highly public setting and highly
public nature of the officers' duties subordinate any privacy
expectation.2 8
The Angel court was careful to distinguish United States v.
McIntyre, decided fifteen years earlier in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.29 There, the chief of police of Globe, Arizona,
recorded all activity in the assistant chiefs office with a microphone
McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The legislative history behind
[Title Ill] reflects Congress's intent that Katz v. United States serve as a guide to
define communications that are uttered under circumstances justifying an
expectation of privacy.") (citation omitted).
22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518, 2520.
23. Id. at §§ 2511(4)(a), 2520.
24. Angel v. Williams, 12 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1993).
25. Id.
26. See id. at 787.





concealed inside a briefcase.3 o The court, while noting that "[a] police
officer is not, by virtue of his profession, deprived of the protection of
the Constitution," constrained its holding to the peculiar facts of the
case. The recordings constituted "oral communications" within the
meaning to Title III because they were intercepted inside a private office
and not recorded as part of "a regulatory scheme," "office practice," or
"internal affairs investigation."32
B. State Laws
Title III expressly preempts state wiretapping laws. 3 3 Thus, states
must, at minimum, extend the same degree of privacy protections. 34
Indeed, at least 21 states and the District of Columbia have passed
statutes identical or fundamentally similar to Title III. 3 However, other
states have passed laws substantially more restrictive than Title III, often
while adding significant variations. This Section discusses several state
statutes and important judicial interpretations in the relevant
jurisdictions. Ten states proscribe the recording of any oral
communication absent all-party consent, while Connecticut and Nevada
only require all-party consent for pure wiretapping (that is, recording the
contents of an electronic wire communication).36 Oregon requires all-
30. United States v. Mcintyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1978).
31. Id. at 1224.
32. Id. It is critical to note that the police exception to wiretapping statutes
advocated by this Article would similarly fail to encompass the facts of McIntyre,
since the proposed exception is only intended to capture public police conduct, such
as field stops, interrogations, searches, and arrests, and not internal affairs, strategy
communications, or private telephone discussions.
33. See Bast, supra note 2, at 845.
34. Id.
35. See infra Table of State Authorities, at app. 1. These states are Alabama,
Arizona, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id.
36. See infra Table of State Authorities, at app. 1. Connecticut is an all-party
consent state for interception of telephonic or other wire communications but
requires only one-party consent for mechanical recording of other conversations.
CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-187 to -189b (2010). There is no reasonable expectation of
privacy requirement, however, for any aural recording, while visual recording is only
20111 495
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party consent for recordation of non-wire conversations but one-party
consent for interception of wire communications . This Section divides
the discussion of several exemplary state statutes into three categories:
(1) all-party consent states with reasonable expectation of privacy
requirements; (2) all-party consent states, without reasonable expectation
of privacy requirements; and (3) one-party consent states.
1. All-Party Consent; Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Required3
a. California
California's wiretapping statute bifurcates communications into
two classes - wire communications and confidential communications.3 9
The state flatly criminalizes the recordation of telephonic, electronic, and
other wire communications, without the consent of all parties, whether
the recorded party displays a reasonable expectation of privacy or not.40
However, the recording of "confidential communications" is only illegal
prohibited for persons in "plain view" without a "reasonable expectation of privacy."
Id. Nevada only punishes surreptitious recording in all cases. NEV. REV. STAT. §§
200.620, 200.650 (2010). The statute requires that just one-party consent for secret
recording of non-telephonic conversations and further demands the recorded party
own a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. There is no reasonable expectation of
privacy requirement for telephonic recording. Id.
37. See infra Table of State Authorities, at app. 1. Oregon criminalizes
wiretapping by any third party without the consent of one party and recording any
non-wire conversation without "specifically inform[ing]" all parties. OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 133.721, 165.535-.543 (2010). The statute is inapplicable inside a person's home,
and at "[p]ublic or semipublic meetings such as governmental or quasi-governmental
bodies, trials, press conferences, public speeches, rallies and sporting or other events
... [r]egularly scheduled classes or similar education activities in public or private
institutions," and during "interviews conducted by peace officers at law enforcement
facilities." Id. Recording is still not permitted in the enumerated exceptions if the
recording device is concealed. Id.
38. The states in this category are California (for non-wire recordings),
Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada (for surreptitious recording of non-telephonic
private conversations), New Hampshire, Oregon (public meeting and police
interview exception), Pennsylvania, and Washington. See infra Table of State
Authorities, at app. 1.
39. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631-632 (West 2010).
40 Id
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if the recorded party owns a reasonable expectation of privacy.41 The
definition of "confidential communications" exempts public gatherings,
hearings, or communications where the recorded party would not
reasonably expect to be overheard.42
It is unclear whether parties who record police officers in the
performance of their public duties would enjoy per se immunity from
prosecution under the "confidential communication" clause.43 California
courts have interpreted the provision in ways that might militate against
blanket insulation from prosecution." For instance, while the California
Court of Appeals has held that a television station that surreptitiously
recorded a business meeting on an outdoor restaurant patio did not
contravene the statute, it also sustained the conviction, in People v.
Gibbons, of a man who used a hidden camera to record sexual
intercourse in his bedroom.45 If the Gibbons holding could be extended
in a non-sexual context to grant third parties inside a private residence a
reasonable expectation of privacy, then recording of police searches,
interviews, and other official conduct in the interior of a home or car
might similarly be prosecuted.46
41. Id.
42. Id. at § 632. The California code states:
"[Clonfidential communication" includes any communication
carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that
any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the
parties thereto, but excludes a communication made in a public
gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or
administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other
circumstance in which the parties to the communication may
reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard
or recorded.
Id.
43. Id. See also Wilkins v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 336 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999); People v. Gibbons, 263 Cal. Rptr. 905, 907-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
44. See, e.g., Gibbons, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 907-09 (visitors at a home for purpose
of sex enjoyed expectation of privacy when blinds were drawn and door closed).
45. See Wilkins, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336; Gibbons, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 907-09.
46. See Gibbons, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 907-09.
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b. Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance
Control Act essentially tracks Title III, word-for-word, with the notable
departure in the law's all-party consent requirement for permissible
interception of oral communications.4 7 Like Title III, recorded parties
must enjoy a justifiable expectation of privacy for criminal liability to
attach to the interceptor.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has confronted the issue of
whether police in the performance of their public duties enjoy a
cognizable privacy interest under the statute.4 9 In Commonwealth v.
Henlen, a prison guard became a suspect in a theft at the Mercer County
Jail.so A Pennsylvania state trooper conducted a custodial interrogation
of Henlen at the jail. 5 The trooper took notes and allowed another prison
52
official to observe the interview. Henlen surreptitiously recorded the
conversation and submitted the tape as part of an internal affairs
complaint against the trooper, yet he was charged and convicted for
illegally intercepting the communication. The Court reversed Henlen's
conviction, finding under Justice Harlan's two-part formula that since
oral police interrogations are customarily recorded, the trooper owned no
objective expectation of privacy.54 Further, since he took notes for a
possible police report and allowed a third party to observe, the trooper
also did not demonstrate a subjective privacy expectation.55 Though
Henlen remains valuable currency for civil rights advocates in search of
a broad police exception to wiretap laws, the court declined to reach
Henlen's broader "argument that a police officer acting in his official
47. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5701-5704 (2010).
48. Id. at § 5702.
49. Commonwealth v. Henlen, 564 A.2d 905, 906-907 (Pa. 1989).




54. Id. at 906-07; see also Gunderman v. Commonwealth Unemployment
Comp. Review Bd., 505 A.2d 1112 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (holding no violation of
wiretapping statute for secretly recording hearing before unemployment
compensation board).
55. Henien, 564 A.2d at 906-07.
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capacity implicitly consents to having his activities monitored" and thus
.56
waives any statutory protections.
c. Washington
The state of Washington's wiretapping law imposes criminal
penalties on anyone that intercepts "private conversations" without the
consent of all parties.5 7 By operation of the statute, a recording party
gains consent by announcing an intent to record in a "reasonably
58
effective manner," and also recording the announcement. An
intermediate appellate court, in a strenuously worded opinion, declined
to include surreptitious recording of a police officer within the ambit of
the prohibition on interception of "private communications." 5 In State v.
Flora, James Flora was questioned by two officers who called him a
"nigger" a year earlier. During this second encounter, Flora hid a live
tape recorder in a stack of papers.61 The police discovered the recorder
and arrested Flora for unlawful interception of a private conversation.62
The court reversed Flora's conviction.63 In accord with
Washington precedent, the court repeated the operative definition of
"private conversation," as a "secret . . . intended only for the persons
involved [who] . . . hold[] a confidential relationship to something . . ;
not open or in public." 6 Moreover, the court refused to "support the
proposition that police officers possess a personal privacy interest in
statements they make as public officers effectuating an arrest." 6 The
56. Id. at 907.
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(1)(b) (2010).
58. Id. at § 9.73.030 (3).
59. State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
60. Id. at 1355.
61. Id. at 1356.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1357-58.
64. Id. at 1357 (citing State v. Slemmer, 738 P.2d 281, 284 (Wash. Ct. App.
1982)). See also State v. Bonilla, 598 P.2d 783, 785 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (using
the quoted definition of "private communication"); State v. Forrester, 587 P.2d 179,
184 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (attributing the ordinary & usual meaning of private
communication).
65. Flora, 845 P.2d at 1357.
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opinion relied on the legislative intent of the statute, which was to protect
66
an individual's right to privacy. As such, the court distinguished
functions performed by police qua police from the personal privacy
interests of officers acting outside their official capacity, which could be
deserving of protection.67 The court's clarion holding dovetails precisely
with this Article's proposal for statutory fixes to the anomaly of
awarding personal privacy protection under state wiretapping laws to
police officers performing their public duties.68 As the court wrote: "We
decline the State's invitation to transform the privacy act into a sword
available for use against individuals by public officers acting in their
official capacity." 69
2. All-Party Consent, No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
a. Illinois
The Illinois Eavesdropping Act is arguably the most draconian in
the nation.70 In fact, the state Legislature amended the statute to
expressly purge the requirement - that courts might impute from
constitutional jurisprudence - that a recorded party demonstrate a
.71
reasonable expectation of privacy. Illinois imposes criminal penalties
on any person, including law enforcement officers, who use an
eavesdropping device to record the part or whole of any conversation,
unless the interceptor has gained the consent of all parties.7 2 Most
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1358.
68. See id. at 1357-58.
69. Id. at 1358.
70. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/14-1, to 2 (2010) (containing no
surreptitious-only requirement, all party consent, and statutory language expressly
disclaiming a reasonable expectation of privacy requirement).
71. See id. at § 5/14-1(d). See also Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963,
970 n.10 (Mass. 2001) (explaining legislative history of the amendment by the
Illinois legislature and disclaiming the reasonable expectation of privacy
requirement).
72. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/14-2(a)(1)(A). The operative definition of
eavesdropping device is "any device capable of being used to hear or record oral
conversation," even if the conversation takes place face-to-face. Id. at § 5/14-(1)(a).
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importantly, Illinois defines the term "conversation" as "any oral
communication between 2 or more persons regardless of whether one or
more of the parties intended their communication to be of a private
nature under circumstances justifying that expectation."73 Illinois' statute
captures both open and surreptitious recording.74 The statute carves out
narrow exceptions for police who intercept communications pursuant to
a court order and for any person who records a public meeting as defined
by the state's Open Meetings Statute.75
In 1986, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in People v. Beardsley,
added a one-party consent and reasonable expectation of privacy gloss to
the statute - specifically in the context of a suspect who recorded police
during a traffic stop.76 When pulled over for traveling 67 miles per hour
in a 55-mile-per-hour zone, Robert Beardsley refused to speak to the
responding McHenry County sheriffs deputy and, instead, began
recording the exchange with a microphone held six inches below the
car's door panel.77 The deputy immediately noticed the microphone and
78told Beardsley that he did not consent to a recording. Still refusing to
surrender his driver's license, Beardsley then was placed in the back seat
of a squad car.79 The deputy and his partner spoke in the front seat, while
this time Beardsley openly recorded the conversation.so Beardsley was
taken to county jail and booked for speeding and criminal
eavesdropping." At the time, the Illinois statute contained no reasonable
expectation of privacy clause but neither had the legislature yet expressly
disclaimed the requirement of a cognizable privacy interest. 8 2
In holding that the Illinois law punishes only surreptitious
recording of objectively and subjectively private conversations, the court
73. Id. at § 5/14-1(d).
74. See id.
75. Id. at § 5/14-(2)(b).
76. See People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 352 (lll. 1986), superseded by
statute, 720, ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/14-1(d), as recognized in Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at
970, n.10.





82. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N. E.2d 963, 970 n.10 (Mass. 2001).
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did not address the privacy rights of police officers qua police officers,
and, instead, stressed the deputies' forfeiture of any privacy expectation
by speaking within earshot of Beardsley.8 3 To reach its decision, the
court relied on the common law definition of eavesdropping - "'to
listen secretly to what is said in private"' - and the reasoning of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Lopez v. United States that recording by parties
who overhear or participate in conversations is justified by the reality
that they are apt to otherwise repeat or later testify as to what they
heard.84 The court's reasoning was concededly strained, and may have
been a pretext for abolishing the disfavored all-party consent requirement
in a troubling set of circumstances. Nonetheless, in response to
Beardsley, the Illinois legislature amended the statute to clarify that the
monitoring of conversations, without all-party consent, is illegal even if
the parties did not intend "'their communication to be of a private
nature.'" Sadly, since the Illinois law applies equally to police officers
and private citizens, the amendment evinces Illinois lawmakers' clear
intent to proscribe both open and surreptitious recording of police
officers, even in the public performance of their official duties. Indeed, in
June 2010 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a federal
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) against the Cook County State's
Attorney's Office, challenging the constitutionality of the statute, on
behalf of six Illinois residents charged with felonies for openly filming
86
encounters with police on their cellular phones.
83. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 352.
84. Id. at 349 (quoting People v. Klingenberg, 339 N.E.2d 456 (Ill. App. Ct.
1975)). See also id. at 350-51 (discussing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437
(1963)).
85. See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 970 n. 10 (citing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/14-
1(d) (1996)).
86. Becky Schlikerman & Kristen Mack, Suit hits ban on recording the police:
ACLU challenges state's eavesdropping law, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 2010, at Al. Two
of the plaintiffs, Adrian and Fanon Perteet, were passengers in a friend's car at a
McDonald's drive-through when officers approached the car, suspecting the driver
of operating under the influence. Id. at 11. Fanon Perteet began filming the officer's
exchange on his cell phone to build an evidentiary record in case of arrest, at which
point he, rather than the driver, was removed from the car. Id. When Adrian Perteet
also began recording his brother's removal, both men were arrested and charged
with felony eavesdropping under 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/14-2(a)(1). See id. They
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b. Massachusetts
Per statute, in Massachusetts, anyone who secretly records any
oral communication without the consent of all parties is guilty of the
crime of unlawful interception.87 The operative definition of "oral
communication" encompasses all "speech," unless transmitted over
88public airwaves. Police officers are subject to the statute's
proscriptions, unless acting under a lawfully issued court order to
investigate only statutorily enumerated offenses committed in
89
furtherance of an organized criminal enterprise. The law prohibits only
surreptitious recording and lacks any reasonable expectation of privacy
.- 90provision.
In 2001, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts jolted the
state's legal and journalistic communities with its expansively worded
opinion in Commonwealth v. Hyde.9 1 In affirming the conviction of
pled guilty to attempted eavesdropping, a misdemeanor, and as part of the plea were
required to formally apologize to the police officers. Id. Steven Silverman, a defense
attorney, called the case against the Perteet brothers "'contempt of cop,"' and said
"'These are archaic statutes, made in a time when technology was different. The
laws need to catch up."' Id. A spokesman for the ACLU said laws such as this create
a double-standard, where only police are allowed to collect and present evidence
arising from an encounter with police. Id. However, Mark Donahue, president of the
Fraternal Order of Police in Chicago, said he believes allowing civilians to make
audio recordings of arrests "'could potentially inhibit an officer from proactively
doing his job."' Id.
87. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (2010) (defining "interception" to
mean "to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly
record the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any
intercepting device by any person other than a person given prior authority by all
parties to such communication . . . ." ) (emphasis added); Id. at § 99(c)(1)
(prohibiting the willful "interception of any wire or oral communication"). The
statute imposes maximum penalties of ten thousand dollars in fines and five years in
prison, or both. Id.
88. Id. at § 99(B)(2).
89. Id. at §§ 99(D)-(N).
90. Id. at §§ 99(B)-(C).
91. See generally Lisa A. Skehill, Note, Cloaking Police Misconduct in
Privacy: Why the Massachusetts Anti- Wiretapping Statute Should Allow for the
Surreptitious Recording of Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981 (2009);
Roger Michel, Criminal Law: Electronic Surveillance - General Laws chapter 272,
504 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW rvol. 9
Michael Hyde, who secretly recorded a contentious traffic stop, the court
rather flatly stated that all surreptitious recording of anyone, regardless
of the public display or function of the recorded party, is per se illegal.92
The court interpreted the legislature's purposeful omission of a
reasonable expectation of privacy provision to reflect a clear intent to
protect all citizens in Massachusetts, whether private citizens, public
officials, police, or, as is the unmistakable implication, political speakers
standing on a soapbox with a megaphone. 93
It all started one night in 1998, when Abington, Massachusetts,
police officers stopped Hyde and a companion because Hyde's Porsche
convertible had a broken taillight and an excessively loud exhaust
system.9 4 Three more officers arrived and the stop escalated into quick
confrontation.95 The officers searched the car and Hyde complained that
the officers targeted him because of his "long hair." 96 The officers
countered with profane rejoinders. Though the police merely gave
Hyde a "verbal warning," he filed an internal affairs complaint and
offered the tape as proof of harassment.98 Instead, the department filed a
criminal complaint against Hyde and he was later charged with illegal
interception of oral communications.9 9
On certification before the state's high court, Hyde, with the
ACLU filing an amicus brief, argued: (1) the legislature enacted the
section 99, 86 MASS. L. REV. 62 (2001) (acerbically criticizing Hyde); Jeff Jacoby,
SJC Drops Ball on Privacy, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 27, 2001, at A9 (arguing against
positive privacy rights for police officers); Editorial, Public Conduct vs. 'Private'
Speech, BOSTON HERALD, July 21, 2001, at 16, available at 2001 WLNR 287853
(disagreeing with Hyde).
92. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 967-70 n.10 (Mass. 2001).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 964.
95. Id.
96. Id. The tape catches Hyde saying the stop was a 'bunch of bullshit"' and
accusing the officers of discrimination. Id.
97. Id. One officer is heard snapping "'[d]on't lay that shit on me," and
another officer called Hyde "'an asshole."' Id. Though not memorialized on Hyde's
recording, the passenger testified at trial that while he was frisked an officer
threatened to conduct a field sobriety test that the officer "'promised"' he would fail.
Id at 964 n.L.
98. Id at 965.
99. Id
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statute to protect private citizens from overzealous police intrusion, not
the contrary; (2) Title III's justifiable expectation of privacy language
should be instructive in interpreting the outer boundaries of the
Massachusetts counterpart; and (3) policy considerations demand that
public police actions not be cloaked behind the curtain of individual
.100
privacy.
Pointing to the "plain language" of the statute, the Court wrote
that the statute unambiguously extends protection from non-consensual,
surreptitious recording to all "members of the public, including . . .
police officers or other public officials interacting with members of the
public."'o Discussing the legislative history of the amendment, the
majority found that the Massachusetts legislature sought to "create a
more restrictive electronic surveillance statute than comparable statutes
in other States."'1 0 2 The majority also argued that a contrary law could
unfairly subject police officers to public approbation, especially since, in
the unsubstantiated estimation of the majority, official misconduct is so
rare that it justifies no exception. o3 The majority also warned that a
police exception would give an upper hand to criminals who might
strategically mount cameras on drug warehouses, for instance, or
otherwise tape encounters with police hoping to seize on "hypothetical
police abuse" at trial.104 Further, the court also feared a judicially crafted
100. See id. at 965-66; Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU in Support of Appellant
at 16-43, Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (No. SJC-08429), at *8 - *34, 2000 WL 34610712.
101. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967.
102. Id. In 1968, the Massachusetts Legislature inserted the all-party consent
requirement into the law, when one-party consent was the prevailing rule in most
jurisdictions throughout the Commonwealth. Id.
103. Id. at 969 ("The value of obtaining probative evidence of occasional
official misconduct does not justify a failure to enforce the clear terms of the
statute.").
104. Id. The court also wrote that a police exception would:
encourage drug manufacturers to mount hidden video cameras
in their facilities so they can capture the moment of truth when
the police execute a search warrant and would authorize drug
dealers secretly to tape record conversations with suspected
undercover officers or with informants in order to protect the
dealers' rights against hypothetical police abuse.
Id.
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expectation of privacy requirement would incentivize untrammeled
recordation of undeserving public employees, like public school teachers
and meter maids. 05
In a sharp dissent, two justices evoked the most infamous
surreptitious recording of public police action in the nation's history: the
Rodney King tape. o0 The dissent concluded, rightfully, that in
Massachusetts, George Holliday's grainy video of four Los Angeles
police officers savagely beating King with nightsticks would amount to
nothing more than inadmissible evidence against the officers, and worse
yet, competent evidence against Holliday in an illegal interception
case. 0 7 Moreover, the dissent declined to find any legislative intent to
inoculate police officers against recordation of their public duties.' 08 The
105. Id. The court noted:
[An exception] would permit the untrammeled interception of
communications by legislators, executive officers and agents,
judicial officials, municipal officers, among others, on the
erroneous supposition that public accountability requires the
practice. It is not our function to craft unwarranted judicial
exceptions to a statute that is unambiguous on its face, and,
particularly, not to attempt to do so by subjecting police and
public officials to sinister accusations or by evoking
unwarranted fears that legitimate interests of the media may be
harmed by the statute.
Id. at 970.
106. Id. at 971 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 972. The dissent notes that the commission tasked with
investigating the King beating stressed just how valuable the video was, since at
least in L.A., it was common police practice to disregard internal affairs complaints:
Our commission owes its existence to the George Holliday
videotape of the Rodney King incident. Whether there even
would have been a Los Angeles Police Department
investigation without the video is doubtful, since the efforts of
King's brother . . . to file a complaint were frustrated, and the
report of the involved officers was falsified.
Id. at 972 (quoting REPORT OF INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES
POLICE DEPARTMENT ii (1991)). See also United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1426
(9th Cir. 1994)(challenging the admissibility of recording against the officers).
108. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 974 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
The legislative intent as reflected in the statutory language is
explicit: to protect the privacy interests of citizens. While the
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dissent also noted that judicial practice in Massachusetts declines to treat
public officials as "'persons"' unless expressly designated by definition
in the statute.109 The dissent deftly neutralized the majority's fear that
ordinary civil servants would otherwise face a deluge of recording by
distinguishing police, writing: "We hold police officers to a higher
standard of conduct than other public employees, and their privacy
interests are concomitantly reduced."' 0 The dissenting justices stressed
that the public holds an insuperable democratic interest in monitoring the
performance of public officials."' The statute cannot extinguish a potent
avenue to this critical supervisory function.11 The dissent also reasoned
it would be perverse for the Legislature to arm police, who already wield
"awesome powers," with a tool for reprisal when caught in the act of
abuse or misconduct." 3
Perhaps emboldened by the sweeping ruling in Hyde, the Boston
Police Department and other police forces in Massachusetts have
arrested numerous people in recent years for the seemingly innocuous act
of openly recording public arrests on their cellular phones.114 Just as
troubling, district attorneys are eagerly prosecuting, as felonies no less,
cases where bystanders take out their cell phones and hold them in plain
sight to record police activity on public streets,'' 5 despite the statute's
statutory language enacted to accomplish these purposes can
be broadly read, there is no suggestion that the Legislature had
in mind outlawing the secret tape recording of a public
exchange between a police officer and a citizen.
Id.
109. Id. at 975 n.13 (citing Commonwealth v. Voight, 556 N.E.2d 115, 116
(Mass. App. Ct. 1990)).
110. Id. at 976.
111. See id.
112. See id
113. Id. at 977. The dissent also feared the majority's expansive interpretation
of the statute would have a chilling effect on the media, since reporters violate the
act by recording police in public or politicians at public meetings merely by
concealing or not overtly displaying their tape recorders. Id.
114. See Daniel Rowinski, Police Fight Cellphone Recordings: Witnesses
taking audio of officers arrested, charged with illegal surveillance, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 12, 2010, at Al.
115. Id
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unambiguous language and the Hyde court's admonition that only
"secret" recording is proscribed.
Simon Glik, who, ironically, was arrested for recording the arrest
of a homeless man in the city's singularly quintessential public space,
Boston Common, successfully defended the charge in court.'"7 A
municipal judge ruled that Glik could not have contravened the law by
holding his Blackberry in plain view, and regardless, his civic right to
document public police activity trumps any police "discomfort."'
Similarly, a trial court dismissed felony charges against Jon Surmacz,
who recorded Boston officers breaking up a house party, and prosecutors
in Western Massachusetts declined to file charges against filmmaker
Emily Peyton, who videotaped police in Greenfield arresting an anti-war
protester.11 9 Both prevailed because they recorded the police activity in
"plain view."120 Not all were so lucky: Jeffrey Manzelli, who recorded
transit police officers making arrests at an anti-war rally, and Peter
Lowney, who recorded Boston University police officers responding to a
protest, were both convicted for allegedly concealing their video
recorders in their jackets.121
There are no official statistics of arrests or convictions for
unlawful interception under the Massachusetts wiretapping statute.122
The cases discussed above only came to light because those arrested
contacted the ACLU, suggesting that the numbers are far higher.123 The
116. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 971.
The problem here could have been avoided if, at the outset of
the traffic stop, the defendant had simply informed the police
of his intention to tape record the encounter, or even held the
tape recorder in plain sight. Had he done so, his recording
would not have been secret, and so would not have violated
G.L. c. 272, § 99.
Id. (footnote omitted).
117. See Massachusetts v. Glik, No. 0701 CR 6687, slip op. at 2-3 (Boston
Mun. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008).
118. Id. at 4.





trend of police officers offensively wielding the wiretapping law to
vindictively arrest those who record their public actions on cell phones,
even in plain view, is highly troubling. It appears the warning of the
dissenters in Hyde that the statute could now be used by "police officers
to conceal possible misconduct behind a cloak of privacy" was
disturbingly prescient.12
c. Montana
The Montana Code defines the crime of "violating privacy in
communications," as, inter alia, recording a conversation without the
knowledge of all parties. 12 5 Importantly, the statute criminalizes only
interception only when the recording device is "hidden." 26 Notably, the
statute provides broad exceptions and does not demand compliance by
"elected or appointed public officials or to public employees when ...
recording is done in the performance of official duty."l27 The Montana
Supreme Court has upheld this wide public official exception against a
128
constitutional challenge for overbreadth. Although the statute plainly
immunizes police, the state's high court has held that unwarranted police
interception of communications may still violate privacy guarantees of
129
state constitutional origin. In fact, the court stated that the Montana
constitution is not coextensive with the U.S. Constitution, and declined
to follow United States v. White, where a divided Supreme Court
determined that one-party consensual interception of communications by
a person acting under color of law does not offend the Fourth
124. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 976 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall,
C.J., dissenting).
125. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(l)(c) (2009).
126. Id.
127. Id. at § 45-8-213(1)(c)(i). Montana also exempts "persons speaking at
public meetings," and health care facilities. Id. at §§ 45-8-213(1)(c)(ii), 45-8-
213(1)(c)(iv). Further, the statute contains a safety valve for parties who provide a
warning of the recordation: "persons given warning of the . .. recording, and if one
person provides the warning, either party may record." Id. at § 45-8-213(c)(iii).
128. See State v. Brown, 755 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Mont. 1988), overruled by
State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008).
129. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 494-98; see also MONT. CONST. art. 2, §§ 10-11.
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Amendment. 130 Montana courts have never ruled on whether, in the




Among the states that have adopted one-party consent
wiretapping statutes and enacted substantive variations from Title III,
Indiana and New Mexico are the only states that punish wiretapping in
its purest form - the use of a recording device to intercept electronic
wire transmissions, namely telephone lines and Internet cables. 13 These
laws appear to allow open or surreptitious recording of public police
actions from a cellular phone or other recording device, but also are
dangerously underinclusive in guarding individual privacy. 3
Another four of the one-party consent states - Alaska,
Arkansas, Kentucky, and New York - do not create safe harbors when
the recorded party lacks reasonable expectation of privacy.134 These laws
potentially expose third parties that record even public police actions,
like George Holliday, to criminal liability.'3 5 Furthermore, Arkansas
exempts any person acting under color of law from the statute's
prohibitions.136
Other states only criminalize surreptitious recording. For
instance, Georgia only proscribes recording "in a clandestine manner" of
130. Id.; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (discussing
that warrantless electronic monitoring of face-to-face conversations, with the consent
of one party to the conversation, does not constitute a search and, therefore, does not
violate the Fourth Amendment); Goetz, 191 P.3d at 494-98.
131. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(l)(c); see also Goetz, 191 P.3d at 494-
98 (discussing state constitutional protections of privacy and search and seizure).
132. See IND. CODE §§ 35-33.5-1-3.5 (2010); N.M. STAT. § 30-12-1 (2010).
133. See IND. CODE §§ 35-33.5-1-3.5; N.M. STAT. § 30-12-1.
134. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 42.20.310 to .320 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-
60-120, 5-16-101 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 526.010, 526.070 (West 2010);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2010).
135. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 42.20.310.320; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-60-120, 5-
16-101; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.010, 526.070; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00.
136. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-60-120, 5-16-101.
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a "private conversation" in a "private place." 3 7 Utah has a similar law.13 8
The Iowa wiretapping statute insulates from prosecution any recording
party who is "openly present and participating in or listening to a
communication."1 39  In Kansas, criminal eavesdropping only occurs
where the recording party enters "into a private place with intent to listen
surreptitiously"; "a private place" is where "sounds would not normally
be audible or comprehensible outside." 40 Maine places a unique twist on
the open-surreptitious distinction; the statute only permits criminal
prosecution if the recorder is not "within the range of normal unaided
hearing."1 41
II. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS FOR THE
RECORDATION OF POLICE IN THE FULFILLMENT OF THEIR PUBLIC
OBLIGATIONS
The right of citizens to record police officers performing their
public duties, without fear of reprisal, must be expressly safeguarded in
state wiretapping statutes. Problematically, the right of mere observers to
record police is not protected by a naked one-party consent provision.142
Moreover, while reasonable expectation of privacy clauses may grant the
positive right to record police, woven into that right is a reciprocal
sacrifice of protections for private parties. 14 Therefore, a specific police
exception written into a state's wiretapping statute is necessary to close
137. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-60, -62 (2010). Private place is defined as "a
place where one is entitled reasonably to expect to be safe from casual or hostile
intrusion or surveillance." Id.
138. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-401 to -402, 77-23a-3 to -4 (2010).
139. IOWA CODE §§ 727.8, 808B.2 (2010).
140. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4001 to -4002 (2010).
141. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 709-711 (2009).
142. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006) (stating "[i]t shall not be
unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a
wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent").
143. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; infra note 154 and
accompanying text (describing Supreme Court decisions that interpret the reasonable
expectation of privacy test to winnow away Fourth Amendment protections).
2011]1 511
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
any loopholes that exist in highly restrictive states like Illinois and
Massachusetts where wiretapping laws may operate to shelter abuse by
police, while still preserving the privacy rights that these broadly
constructed statutes rightfully afford individuals.144
As evidenced by the constitutional and public policy
considerations that follow, this Article concludes that there is
fundamental democratic and practical evidentiary value in any recording
of public police conduct, whether intercepted by a party to the
conversation or not, and whether surreptitious or open.145 In sum, this
Article (1) declines to state a preference for one-party or all-party
consent; and (2) argues more narrowly that all wiretapping statutes
should include an express exception from criminal prosecution or civil
liability for parties that, openly or surreptitiously, intercept
communications made by police during public performance of their
duties.146 Part A of this Section discusses why a specific statutory
exclusion for police is preferable to the broader reasonable expectation of
privacy provisions, which do allow recording of police in many states,
because such provisions could collaterally capture too many private
individual communications, and subject citizens to greater state
intrusions. 147 Part B argues that Fourth Amendment principles militate in
favor of a specific statutory exception to criminalization of all recording
of public police conduct. 14 8 Part C offers First Amendment arguments in
favor of the exception. 14 9 Part D discusses public policy and other
prudential reasons that states should amend their wiretapping laws to
include police exceptions. 15
144. See supra notes 87-124 and accompanying text; see also supra note 18
and accompanying text; infra note 154 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 151-271 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 151-271 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 158-82 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 183-233 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 234-71 and accompanying text.
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A. Solving the Police Problem with a One-Party Consent Provision
Collaterally Sacrifices Individual Rights
Generally, one-party consent statutes would preclude criminal
prosecution for interception of conversations between a police officer
and a surreptitious recorder, such as Michael Hyde." However, one-
party statutes are glaringly underinclusive, as single-party consent still
leaves third party recorders - such as Simon Glik or George Holliday
- vulnerable to criminal liability.15 Since mere onlookers are not
parties to any communication, any subjective assent on their behalf does
not operate as the requisite one-party consent under the plain language of
most wiretapping statutes.
Similarly, clauses that only protect parties who demonstrate a
cognizable expectation of privacy are highly problematic for states that
wish to provide private citizens a higher ceiling of protection than the
constitutional minima required by many courts' rapidly ebbing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.1 54 If deployed to vindicate the right of the
public to record open and official police conduct, these reasonable
expectation of privacy provisions also blast a wide swath of collateral
damage.155 In other scenarios, these statutes subject private victims of
overwrought state surveillance to the whim of the state judiciary's
151. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006).
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir. 2010) (denying
motion to suppress surreptitious police wiretapping of cocaine deal because
defendant had no objective privacy expectation as visitor to motel room); United
States v. Turner, 209 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding surreptitious
police recording of defendant's conversation with companion in the back seat of
patrol car, while police conducted unsuccessful car search, did not violate Title III
because defendant's expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable); Kee v.
City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 208-13 (5th Cir. 2001) (dismissing civil suit under
Title III because husband recorded without a warrant had no subjective expectation
of privacy in oral prayers and statements at public gravesite of dead children where
wife was suspect); United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 11 53, 1169 (5th Cir. 1985)
(no reasonable expectation of privacy from third party wiretap in conversation
between prison inmate and visiting wife). See also supra note 15 and accompanying
text (describing cases where reasonable privacy has not been recognized).
155. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
2011] 513
514 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol.9
determination of whether their privacy interest is "reasonable."156 Worse
yet, individuals could be left to defend themselves with only the fallow
shield of Fourth Amendment protection that remains after three decades
of Supreme Court hostility.157 As such, nearly all wiretapping statutes
introduce a tension between safeguarding individual privacy and
permitting the dissemination of police recordings, which bear democratic
and evidentiary relevance. To reach equipoise between these twin
interests, this Article argues for an express statutory exception,
protecting the recordation of public police activity.
B. Arguments Based on Background Fourth Amendment Principles
The history of most state wiretapping statutes evinces a
legislative preference to protect individual privacy. In fact, many
wiretapping laws expressly declare the aim of protecting the individual in
the preambles to statutory text.'59 For four decades, the Supreme Court
has adhered to Justice Harlan's two-tiered reasonable expectation of
privacy formula to determine when invasions of privacy trigger
constitutional protection under the Fourth Amendment.1 60 As informed
by numerous courts and mere common sense, police officers in the
156. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(A) (2010) (declaring, "The
general court further finds that the uncontrolled development and unrestricted use of
modem electronic surveillance devices pose grave dangers to the privacy of all
citizens of the commonwealth"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 2010). The
California Penal Code states:
The Legislature hereby declares that advances in science and
technology have led to the development of new devices and
techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private
communications and that the invasion of privacy resulting
from the continual and increasing use of such devices and
techniques has created a serious threat to the free exercise of




160. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
2011] POLICE PRIVACY 515
public performance of their duties do not own an objective expectation of
privacy, or in other words, a privacy interest that society is willing accept
as reasonable. 16 ' Therefore, police officers in their public capacities lack
the requisite privacy interest to fall within the intended scope of
wiretapping statutes.162
Under Justice Harlan's two-part inquiry, the first prong of the
test, whether a person demonstrates an actual subjective expectation of
privacy, is a question of fact, but the second prong, whether the
expectation is "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,"'
is a question of law.163 Though it is conceivable, albeit difficult to
believe, that police officers could manifest a subjective expectation of
privacy in their public actions, the controlling test functionally collapses
into a single inquiry: is a police officer's expectation that his public
actions will not be recorded "reasonable?"' 6
As a matter of law, most common scenarios where the public
interacts with police officers already lack privacy protection under
prevailing judicial interpretations.165 Courts have generally concluded
that conversations in open and public spaces - where the majority of
police recordation likely occurs - countenances against finding an
objective privacy expectation. In the seminal Katz case, the Supreme
Court stated flatly that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. Of utmost importance, the Court also has found that
communications during traffic stops - another fertile area where
161. See id; Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Co., 799 A.2d 566, 595 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2002); State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Henlen, 564 A.2d 905, 906-07 (Pa. 1989).
162. See Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 595; Flora, 845 P.2d at 1357; Henlen, 564
A.2d at 907.
163. See Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 592 (citing United States v. Clark, 22 F.3d
799, 801 (8th Cir. 1994)).
164. See id.
165. See Beckamer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984); Kee v. City of
Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 217 n.21 (5th Cir. 2001); Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 593.
166. See Kee, 247 F.3d at 217 n.21; Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 593.
167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Wishart v.
McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (1st Cir. 1974) (stating "[t]he right to privacy
. . . may be surrendered by public display").
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recording an encounter with police would be of utility in a subsequent
criminal proceeding - are akin to open and public conversations, and
thus, fall outside the sphere of justifiable Fourth Amendment
protection. In Beckamer v. McCarty, Justice Marshall wrote: "the
typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. Passersby on foot,
or in other cars, witness the interaction of officer and motorist."l69
The locus of the communication is not the only factor that
militates against an objective privacy expectation for public police
action.170 Importantly, the likelihood that a police communication will be
publicly reported dilutes any privacy, expectation.' 7 This formulation is
anchored in the same reasoning as the Katz Court's admonition that
knowing exposure of a conversation to the public is tantamount to a
surrender of constitutional protection.172 It is a mainstay of the police
officer's obligation to the public to accurately document and report
communications made in an official capacity, whether via a log of
activity, an arrest report, or an application for a search warrant. Under
open records laws, these reports are almost universally available to the
public and media, as they are intended to serve as a medium of
transparency. Moreover, police routinely, in fact, frequently, testify in
criminal trials as to the contents of conversations or interrogations with
the accused. In short, under Katz and its progeny, the officer's binding
commitment to accurately report his actions, whether at trial or
elsewhere, to the public creates the requisite exposure that, in turn,
divests officers of any privacy right against recordation. 73
Likewise, parties or witnesses to a police communication, where
the officer is performing his public duties, whether an arrest, traffic stop
168. Beckamer, 468 U.S. at 438; see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
48 (1970). In Chambers, the Court held that individuals usually lack an objective
expectation of privacy in an automobile because cars are exposed to the public.
Additionally, vehicles can be moved quickly and therefore it is not practicable to
require officers to secure a warrant. Id.
169. Beckamer, 468 U.S. at 438.
170. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
171. Kee, 247 F.3d at 214 (enumerating six nonexclusive factors to weigh
subjective expectation of privacy which include, inter alia, "the potential for
communications to be reported").
172. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
173. See id.; Kee, 247 F.3d at 215.
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or execution of search warrant, are regularly and necessarily called into
court to repeat or testify about the encounter. Interception of police
communications, therefore, is indistinguishable from the recordings
protected by Lopez v. United States. In Lopez, the Court declined to
suppress a recording of the defendant bribing an IRS agent who wore a
wire because the agent could just as readily repeat or testify about the
contents of the conversation, thus extinguishing any subjective privacy
.174
expectation.
Importantly, several state courts have held that police, while
fulfilling their public duties, forfeit an expectation of privacy that they
might otherwise be entitled to as private civilians.175 While it is true that
police officers qua police officers do not sacrifice all constitutional
rights, several courts have held that officers must expect a diminished
measure of privacy protection in their interactions with the public. 176 The
New Jersey Superior Court wrote, "police officers, because they occupy
positions of public trust and exercise special powers, have a diminished
expectation of privacy."1 77 Quoting the same authority, the New Jersey
Superior Court held in Hornberger v. American Broadcasting Company
that police officers lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
communications with the public that could trigger the state wiretapping
174. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437-39 (1963).
175. See Homberger v. Am. Broad. Co., 799 A.2d 566, 595 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002); State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Henlen, 564 A.2d 905, 907 (Pa. 1989).
176. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). In the famous
Massachusetts case, McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, future U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, wrote, "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman," in denying
the First Amendment claims of an officer fired for his political beliefs. 29 N.E. 517,
517 (Mass. 1892). Justice Holmes' blanket statement that police, in their public
function, lack constitutional rights is no longer good law. See Garrity, 385 U.S. at
500. In Garrity v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held "policemen, like teachers and
lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." Id.
Still, although officers qua officers retain constitutional protection, some rights may
permissibly be restricted, as is the case with many public employees. Id.
177. Hart v. City of Jersey City, 706 A.2d 256, 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998); see also Rawlings v. Police Dep't of Jersey City, 627 A.2d 602, 605 (N.J.
1993) ("As a police officer, plaintiff had a diminished expectation of privacy.").
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statute's ban on surreptitious third-party interception. In State v. Flora,
the Washington Appeals Court found that the awesome power wielded
by police, the concomitant public need to supervise that authority, and
the officer's role as public servant all coalesced to deny police in their
public capacities a privacy interest deserving of constitutional or
statutory protection.17 9 Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit denied police officers the protection of Title III when
interacting with suspects.s 0 In dismissing a police officer's invasion of
privacy tort action, the Kansas Supreme Court echoed the same
reasoning, writing: "a public official, afortiori, has no right of privacy as
to the manner in which he conducts himself in office."' 8' Contrary to the
isolated case like Commonwealth v. Hyde, where the court engaged in an
overinclusive read of the state's wiretapping statute to include protection
of police, a majority of courts have rightfully declined police the shelter
178. Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 595. In Hornberger, three Jamestown, New
Jersey, police officers filed tort actions and brought suit under the New Jersey
wiretapping statute, alleging that the television network ABC and three African
American "testers" surreptitiously recorded private discussions among the officers.
Id. at 570-71. The officers pulled over the three men, who were driving lawfully in a
Mercedes Benz to test the conduct of police officers along the New Jersey Turnpike
for a Primetime Live special on racial profiling called "Driving While Black." Id. at
571. While detained outside the car, the testers captured the officers on a hidden
camera as they searched the car, and opened a small cosmetic case without consent.
Id. at 571-72. Upon discovering the case, one officer remarked, "probably dope." Id.
Since the "testers" were not parties to the conversation, the recording did not qualify
as a one-party consent communication. Id. at 590. However, New Jersey's
wiretapping law is modeled after Title III and contains a reasonable expectation of
privacy requirement. Id. The court reasoned that the officers had no reasonable
expectation of privacy capable of triggering the statute's protections because (1) the
conversations occurred within earshot of the suspects, and more importantly, (2)
police officers in the public performance of their duties do not possess personal
privacy interests. Id. at 594.
179. See State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355 (1992); supra notes 59-69 and
accompanying text.
180. Angel v. Williams, 12 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1993). See supra notes 24-
29 and accompanying text.
181. Rawlins v. Hutchinson News Publ'g Co., 543 P.2d 988, 993 (Kan. 1975).
The court continued: "[s]uch facts are 'public facts' and not 'private facts."' Id.
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of individual privacy and the safe harbor of state wiretapping statutes,
where officers are fulfilling their public obligations. 18 2
C. Arguments Based on Background First Amendment Principles
While police officers lack a right to privacy in their public
communications, the right of ordinary individuals to record police
activity on increasingly ubiquitous cellular phones and mobile devices is
constitutionally grounded.1 83 First Amendment jurisprudence suggests
that there is a positive constitutional liberty to gather and receive
information regarding matters of public interest, and, within the ambit of
this protected expression, to record public police actions without state
interference. 14This right stems from the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Stanley v. Georgia that the First Amendment "protects
the right to receive information and ideas."185 The right to receive
information about public officials is necessary to inform and enable
political discourse in a democracy.186 Recordings of police heroism, from
the harrowing images of the first responders to the September 11 attacks
to a simple photograph of an officer rescuing a cat from a tree, are
evocative of the nation's collective reverence for the police officer. Few
would suggest that such images are outside the scope of the First
Amendment. By the same logic, the cloak of privacy cannot obscure the
Constitution's important function of maintaining uncongested channels
of communication in the instances, however rare, where police betray the
public trust.187 In that vein, the video of the Rodney King beating was
more powerful in its political message than any reaction speech or ex
post facto report. After an explanation of Bartnicki v. Vopper - where
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects the right to
182. See supra notes 92-116 and accompanying text (discussing the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's ruling in Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750
N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001)).
183. See e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Robinson v.
Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
184. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564; Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
185. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
186. See id.
187. See id.; Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
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disseminate or publish recordings of public significance, even if another
8
party illegally intercepted the recording - this Section argues that
recording public police activity is so infused with elements of political
discourse that the First Amendment safeguards the practice.189
1. The Right to Publish Public Police Communications
In Bartnicki, an "unidentified" third party "intercepted" a phone
call between a central Pennsylvania teachers' union negotiator and the
president of the local chapter.' 90 On the call, the union president
threatens "[t]o 'blow off . . . [the] front porches' of school board
members.191 A local anti-tax activist found an unmarked copy of this
recording in his mailbox and delivered it to Frederick Vopper, a radio
disc jockey.192 Vopper played the tape, and union officials filed an action
for damages pursuant to the civil remedies provided by the Pennsylvania
wiretapping statute and Title III.' 93 Both statutes criminalize third party
interception, where the recorded parties enjoy a reasonable expectation
of privacy, and publication of any illegally intercepted communication.194
However, Vopper filed for summary judgment, asserting a positive First
Amendment right to publicly disseminate the tape recordings. 9
Writing for a six-to-three majority, Justice Stevens framed the
issue narrowly: If a publisher of information has lawfully acquired the
information from a source that obtained it unlawfully, may the
govemment punish the ensuing publication?l96 The Court first
determined that the wiretapping statutes' proscriptions on publication of
illegally intercepted communications were content-neutral regulations,
and thus, not violative of the First Amendment on their face. 9 7 Next, the
188. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534-35 (2001).
189. See infra notes 190-233 and accompanying text.
190. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518-19.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 519.
193. Id. at 519-20.
194. See id. at 520 n.3.
195. Id. at 520.
196. See id. at 525.
197 Id at 526.
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Court agreed with the defendant that statutory prohibitions on
publication regulated "pure speech" as opposed to mere conduct.'98
Finally, the Court balanced the government's objectives for
prohibition of that speech against the broad interest in public reception of
"truthful information of public concern." 9 9 The Court stated two
cognizable interests served by the statute: (1) "removing an incentive for
parties to intercept private conversations" and (2) "minimizing the harm
to persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted." 20 0 The
Court focused almost exclusively on the second interest, stating that "the
disclosure of the contents of a private conversation can be an even
greater intrusion on privacy than the interception itself."201' Noting the
heavy presumption against prior restraint of truthful information, Justice
Stevens wrote that constitutional balances tipped in favor of publication
of matters of "public importance" when weighted against individual
privacy.202 In a pronouncement all the more fitting when applied to
police officers rather than union negotiators, the Court wrote: "One of
the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant
loss of privacy." 20 3
Other courts have engaged in a similar balancing of the right of
publication against the inchoate privacy desires of public officials, in the
specific context of public police actions.204 At least one court has flatly
stated that public exposure of police activity is of even greater public
significance than the hyperbolic, and decidedly private, telephone
205
conversation between labor organizers in Bartnicki. In Jean v.
Massachusetts State Police, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that Bartnicki controlled where a "citizen journalist"
published a surreptitious recording caught on a "nanny-cam" of state
198. Id. at 526-27. The Court analogized the delivery of a tape recording to
"the delivery of a handbill or a pamphlet, and as such, it is the kind of 'speech' that
the First Amendment protects." Id. at 527.
199. Id. at 529, 534.
200. Id. at 529.
201. See id. at 533.
202. Id. at 534-35.
203. Id. at 534.
204. See, e.g., Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2007).
205 Id
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206
troopers conducting a warrantless and illegal search of a home. Even
though the recording amounted to an illegal interception under the
flawed interpretation of the Massachusetts wiretapping statute in Hyde,
the court concluded that the government interest in police privacy during
,,201
a home search is "less compelling in this case than in Bartnicki. In
fact, the First Circuit emphatically wrote that the privacy interest of
police officers in public is "virtually irrelevant," when, as in Jean, they
conduct searches in front of numerous witnesses including other officers,
208
and a home's occupants. Therefore, the sound reasoning of Bartnicki
and Jean provides more ammunition for the proposition that any privacy
right asserted by police in the public fulfillment of their duties evaporates
beneath the paramount constitutional importance of responsible scrutiny
of public officers, and the valuable information it contributes to political
209
debate and the ordering of society.
2. The Right to Receive Information about Public Police Conduct
The Bartnicki decision was clear that the First Amendment only
immunizes publishers with clean hands and not the original and illegal
recorder.210 However, Bartnicki will be instructive should the Court ever
visit the issue of whether the First Amendment also creates a right to
record public police activity. 2 11 For one, the Court once again invigorates
the underlying constitutional value of public access to information of
democratic relevance.212 The Court stressed that personal privacy rights
are of a lesser constitutional pedigree than the right of the public to
206. Id.
207. Id. at 33. It is also critical to note that the exceptions to state wiretapping
laws proposed in this Article would not likely shield from prosecution the recorder
of a Bartnicki-like conversation between police officers. There, union officials were
on the telephone, outside the earshot of others. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518.
Similarly, police officers off duty, or in relative seclusion, should maintain a privacy
interest in their communications and could invoke the protection of a state
wiretapping law, notwithstanding this Article's proposed exception.
208. Jean, 492 F.3d at 30.
209. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534-35; Jean, 492 F.3d at 29-30.
210. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 524-25.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 534-35.
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receive information, particularly when public officials are the
213
purportedly aggrieved parties. Moreover, the public concern attached
to monitoring the activity of police through recordation, would seem far
greater than the concern attendant to the insular labor dispute classified
as a public matter in Bartnicki.214 While the public relevance in Bartnicki
centered on the pecuniary, namely the allocation of public resources, the
dominant public issue involved in the recordation of police is liberty, that
is, the government's exercise of its most solemn authority - the power
of arrest and deprivation of freedom.2 15
The publication protected by Bartnicki might also be
distinguished from the interception of public police communications
because the act of interception could be construed as mere conduct not of
constitutional dimension rather than expressive activity insulated by the
First Amendment.216 However, a diverse range of courts seem to suggest
that recordation of police is sufficiently tinged with elements of speech,
if not a wholly protected class of pure speech, that it deserves robust First
217Amendment protection.
It is a well-established constitutional principle from Stanley that
the right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment also protects
"the right to receive information and ideas."218 The Supreme Court has
called this right "fundamental to our free society."219 At least one federal
court has held that the speech principles safeguarded by Stanley create a
positive constitutional liberty to videotape police officers on a public
highway, and thus receive information and speak out on issues of public
concern.220 In Robinson v. Fetterman, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania awarded damages pursuant to § 1983 to
213. See id. ("[P]rivacy concerns give way when balanced against the interests
in publishing matters of public importance.").
214. See id. at 534; Jean, 492 F.3d at 30.
215. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534. Jean, 492 F.3d at 30.
216. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 524-25.
217. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.
2000); Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
218. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). See also Robinson, 378 F.
Supp. 2d at 541 (finding First Amendment protection to receive and gather
information).
219. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
220. Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
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a truck driver twice arrested for criminal harassment after videotaping
police at a truck inspection point on a state highway.221 First, the court
cited favorably the Supreme Court's statement in City of Houston v. Hill
that "the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal
criticism and challenge directed at police officers."222 Just like the police
in Hyde or Glik, the Court pulled back the curtain and determined that
the officers decided to "unreasonably apply a valid law in order to arrest
someone who annoys or offends them." 2 23 The court further held that the
First Amendment preserved Robinson's right to express his concern
about the safety of truck inspections through videotaping officers. 2 24 The
court wrote: "Videotaping is a legitimate means of gathering information
for public dissemination and can often provide cogent evidence, as it did
in this case."225 Finally, the court held that the officers' confiscation of
the tape upon Robinson's arrest was tantamount to a prior restraint in
226
further contravention of the First Amendment. Other courts have
applied similar reasoning in allowing recordation of police and public
227
officials. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit wrote
that, subject to valid time, place, and manner restrictions, the First
Amendment protects the right to photograph or videotape police
228
conduct. The right stems from the positive liberty of the citizens to
gather information about matters of public interest.229
221. Id. at 538-40. Section 1983 creates a civil cause of action for
compensatory and punitive damages when any person acting under color of law
"subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
222. Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482
U.S. 451, 461 (1987)).
223. Id. at 542; see also Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 970-71
(Mass. 2001).
224. Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.
2000).
228. Id.
229. Id. (citation omitted).
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Since the right to record public police activity falls within the
scope of First Amendment protection, nothing short of a compelling
government interest should justify criminalization of the act under the
strict judicial scrutiny it deserves.230 As the First Circuit said in Jean, as
oxymoronic the argument sounds, the purported privacy interest in public
police conduct is "virtually irrelevant." 23 1 Surely passive recording of
police activity, surreptitiously or openly, does not imperil public safety
232
or the efficacy of the police function. That officers may interpret the
act of recording as expressive of opprobrium or insult is immaterial.
Even if one can conjure highly particularized scenarios where recording
amounts to an interference of the police function, an absolute ban is
hardly sufficiently narrowly tailored. Outright bans are overinclusive
because they equally punish innocuous acts of recording, such as the
witness standing at a distance who records an arrest on a cellular phone
or the driver at a traffic stop who records the exchange on a mobile
device from inside her pocket. In short, the public enjoys a positive
liberty to receive information about how police wield their awesome
power, and this free speech right is unconstitutionally extinguished by
23
undemocratic bans on recordation of public police conduct.
D. Public Policy Arguments
In addition to the constitutional principles supporting a broad
exception in state wiretapping statutes for recordation of public police
activity, numerous public policy arguments further bolster the proposal.
This Part discusses three primary public policy purposes advanced by
such an exception: (1) promotion of the availability of probative
evidence in criminal cases; (2) greater evidentiary support for the
vindication of civil rights in § 1983 cases; and (3) a need for symmetry
with best police practices, which favor recordation of custodial
230. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
231. Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2007).
232. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 970-71 (2001) (facts
in common scenario show surreptitious recording of police in no way interferes with
investigation or arrest).
233. See Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); Robinson v. Fetterman, 378
F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
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interrogations, confessions, and even in many jurisdictions, field stops
234
from cameras mounted on patrol cars.
1. Promotion of Probative Evidence in Criminal Trials
In the age of the iPhone, it is increasingly common for
dispositive evidence in criminal trials to come in the form of audio or
video captured by ordinary cellular phones or mobile devices.235
However, wiretapping statutes pose a dangerous problem in states that
236
prohibit surreptitious or one-party recording. Perversely, video or
audio evidence, instead of exonerating the innocent or assuring the
conviction of the guilty, could be suppressed under the applicable
wiretapping statutes.237
In the context of police actions, state laws like those in Illinois or
Massachusetts that bar all surreptitious recordings would forestall the
prosecution of police officers, even when the misconduct is captured on
tape.238 As the dissent in Hyde astutely points out, had police beaten
Rodney King in Massachusetts, it might have been George Holliday,
234. See infra notes 235-74 and accompanying text.
235. See e.g., Erica Pearson & John Lauinger, Hofstra Gang Rape Story Was
All a Lie, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 17, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 18305500;
Ann Givens, Hofstra false gang-rape accuser won't be charged, NEWSDAY, Sept.
25, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 18956516; Timothy Williams, Recorded on a
Suspect's Hidden MP3 Player, a Bronx Detective Faces 12 Perjury Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at B7.
236. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/14-1 (2010) (containing no surreptitious-
only requirement, all party consent, and statutory language expressly disclaiming a
reasonable expectation of privacy requirement); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99
(2010).
237. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/14-1; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99.
The problem is equally troubling in criminal trials not involving police. See Pearson
& Lauinger, supra note 235, at A2. Four men charged in a brutal rape of a Hofstra
University freshman, who claimed to be bound in a dormitory bathroom, were
quickly released from jail when a recording made on an unknown cell phone
revealed the sex was consensual and without bondage. Givens, supra note 235. Yet,
it is entirely conceivable that, at trial, a judge would have been forced to suppress the
exculpatory video in a state like Illinois or Massachusetts, where third party
surreptitious recordings are outlawed and barred from admission at trial. See 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/14-1 to -2; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99.
238. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/14-2; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99.
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rather than the four abusive officers, charged in the aftermath of the
incident.2 39  Holliday's crime: "secretly" recording police without
consent.240 The scenario continues to repeat itself. When a Bay Area
Rapid Transit police officer shot and killed Oscar Grant, an unarmed
passenger laying face down on the platform, passengers on a nearby train
did what has become commonplace in the mobile era - they took out
241
their cell phones and pressed record. Within days the videos hit the
242news and outrage grew. Protests swelled in Oakland, and the officer
243
eventually was charged. In a few of the most restrictive states, like
Illinois, where even non-surreptitious one-party recordings are barred, or
Massachusetts, where recording is illegal if "secret," irrefutable evidence
of police misconduct might never see the courtroom.244
Even worse, there is reason to believe exculpatory evidence
collected in violation of wiretapping statutes might never be admitted in
245criminal trials in places such as Massachusetts or Illinois. For instance,
in the attempted murder prosecution of Erick Crespo, police perjury that
exonerated Crespo only came to light because he surreptitiously recorded
a custodial interrogation on an mp3 player concealed in his pocket.246 In
239. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 971-72 (2001) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting).
240. See id
241. Demian Bulwa, BART Urges Patience over Video of Shooting, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 5, 2009, at Al.
242. See Henry K. Lee, 3 Charged in Shooting Protest, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 10,
2009, at A4.
243. Id.; Demian Bulwa, Leslie Fulbright, & Henry K. Lee, BART Officer
Arrested, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 14, 2009, at Al. The officer, Johannes Mehserle, was
convicted by a jury of involuntary manslaughter, but found not guilty on charges of
second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Demian Bulwa, Verdict: Jury
Finds Former BART Officer Guilty on Involuntary Manslaughter Charge, S.F.
CHRON., July 9, 2010, at Al. Mehserle was sentenced to two years in prison. Demian
Bulwa, 2 Years for Mehserle - Protests in Streets, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 6, 2010, at Al.
244. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/14-1 to -2 (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
272, § 99 (2010).
245. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/14-2; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99. See
also Williams, supra note 235, at B7.
246. Williams, supra note 235, at B7. New York is a one-party consent state,
so the recording was not illicit under the controlling wiretapping laws. N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 250.00, 250.05 (McKinney 2008).
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sworn testimony at Crespo's trial for attempted murder, Detective
Christopher Perino repeatedly stated that he never interrogated Crespo,
but heard the suspect tell his mother, '"[t]hey want to know why I shot
this guy."'I247n fact, in the one-hour-and-fifteen-minute interrogation
captured on tape, Detective Perino not only asked a battery of questions
but also told Crespo he would never be allowed to tell his version of the
events at trial if he didn't sign a confession and dissuaded Crespo from
consulting a lawyer.248 On cross-examination, Detective Perino testified:
"I never interrogated your client, sir." 24 9 Given the overwhelming
prejudicial effect of police testimony on jurors, Crespo would likely have
been convicted without the recording. The attempted murder charges
were swiftly dropped (Crespo pled guilty to lesser weapons charges), and
in subsequently charging Officer Perino, the Bronx District Attorney said
he hoped the charges would send "a strong message" about police
accountability.250 The message plainly failed to reach states like
Massachusetts and Illinois.25
2. Vindication of Constitutional Rights in § 1983 Actions
States that shield police officers from public recordation also
shield themselves from liability - doubling the injustices created by these
statutes. Congress passed § 1983 precisely for citizens like Erick Crespo
and Simon Glik, and the family of Oscar Grant, who suffer deprivation
of basic constitutional liberties at the hands of law enforcement
officers.252 Yet, § 1983 creates a civil cause of action, and, as such,
plaintiffs carry the burden of proving a denial of the alleged
constitutional violation by a preponderance of the evidence.253 Video and




251. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 968 (2001).
252. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (creating a private right of action for persons




audio evidence are uniquely probative and must be admissible in § 1983
254
actions.
In fact, the Supreme Court has hailed the merits of such
evidence, holding that videos in particular create a practically
unimpeachable evidentiary record, even at the summary judgment phase
255
of trial. In Scott v. Harris, the Court dismissed a § 1983 action
alleging that Georgia county deputies rammed a suspect's fleeing car in
256an 85-mile-per-hour car chase. At issue was whether the purposeful,
potentially lethal, high speed collision represented excessive force
violative of Harris's Fourth Amendment right of freedom from
"unreasonable seizure."257 Harris contended that his driving was not so
dangerous to justify deadly force by the officers in terminating the
chase.258 He argued that the Court was bound to accept this version of
events for the purposes of reviewing the officer's motion for summary
259judgment. Justice Scalia wrote that although a court is obligated to
review the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there
was "an added wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of a videotape
capturing the events in question." 2 60 The Court echoed the familiar
summary judgment standard of review, and ruled that when, as here, the
videotape represented dispositive proof of the frivolity of Harris's § 1983
claim, judgment must be granted because the evidence unmasked no
"'genuine issue for trial." 2 6 1 Praising the probative value of video
evidence, Justice Scalia wrote that rather than relying on the plaintiffs
"visible fiction," the court "should have viewed the facts in the light
depicted by the videotape."26 2
State wiretapping laws must allow for the admissibility of
exculpatory or inculpatory documentary evidence in the criminal or civil
254. See generally Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007).
255. See id.
256. Id. at 374-76.
257. Id. at 376.
258. See id. at 378-79.
259. See id.
260. Id. at 378.
261. Id. at 380-81 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
262 Id
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trials of police officers, whether or not the evidence amounts to an
unlawful recording under the applicable wiretapping statute. A bystander
who watches a police officer in the fulfillment of his public duties should
not need to request "consent" before documenting breaches of the public
trust and acts of heroism alike. To cloak public police action behind the
veil of privacy is to give license to officers to abuse their authority
because the risk of getting caught evaporates beneath the aura of
impunity. Statutes that render the nonconsensual recordation of police
inadmissible in § 1983 actions are blockading access to uniquely
probative evidence. Recordings of police encounters, as the Supreme
Court stated in Scott, save valuable judicial resources since in many
cases they can dispositively vindicate the constitutional rights of victims,
or validate the propriety of the challenged actions of law enforcement
officers.263 There are no justifiable reasons to blindfold judges and juries
from access to consummately public and probative evidence simply
because the recorder did not ask police permission.
3. Symmetry with Best Police Practices
Lastly, a broad exception to state wiretapping laws allowing
civilian recording of public police actions is consonant with the growing
consensus among police, judges, and researchers about the need for
264
recording of major evidentiary events in the criminal process. Across
the nation, growing numbers of police departments, voluntarily or by
law, are mandating recordation of confessions, custodial interrogations
263. Id. at 378-81.
264. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial
Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1127-44
(2005); N.J. SUP. CT. SPECIAL COMM. ON RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION, REPORT OF SUPREME COURT SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS (Apr. 15, 2005); N.Y. COUNTRY
LAWYERS' AssoC. & A.B.A SECTION OF CRIM. JUSTICE, RESOLUTION ENDORSING
VIDEOTAPED INTERROGATIONS & ACCOMPANYING REPORT (Feb. 9, 2004); NAT'L
DIST. ATr'YS ASSOC., POLICY ON ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF STATEMENTS (Oct. 23,
2004) ("America's prosecutors encourage police agencies to record statements by
suspects and witnesses but recognize that there are circumstances in which the
statements are not or could not be recorded."); AM. LAW INST., MODEL CODE OF PRE-




and corporeal identifications. Many jurisdictions also mandate
recordation of a broader range of police encounters with the public - like
field stops taped from cameras mounted on patrol cars.266 Recordation of
confessions and interrogations ensures the integrity of the criminal
justice process and forestalls coerced or ambiguous confessions, which
are a primary cause of wrongful convictions in the United States. 2 67
Likewise, recordation is a powerful deterrent against not only police
268misconduct but also defendant perjury at trial. Where a powerful and
growing chorus of police, prosecutors, judges, and scholars endorse
recordation of police encounters with suspects, state laws that prohibit
civilians from engaging in the same conduct are oddly asymmetric.269
These dissonant state laws detract from the widely acknowledged utility
of recorded evidence for subsequent use in criminal trials.270 Symmetry
with this growing body of favorable research is manifestly desirable as a
check on the fulfillment of the duty to record by individual officers,
verification of the accuracy of the recordings, and the general integrity of
271the judicial process.
CONCLUSION
There is fundamental democratic and practical evidentiary value
in any recording of public police conduct. Any place where the
government is vested with a positive statutory right to suppress potent
memorials of its own misconduct or the evidence of a citizen's innocence
is not a democracy; it's a police state. Moreover, civilian recordings of
encounters between citizens and police often produce reliable inculpatory
evidence that promotes our collective faith in the integrity of the justice
system. State legislatures should move quickly to adopt statutory
exceptions to the criminalization of civilian recordation of police in the
fulfillment of their public obligations. Constitutional principles,
265. See Sullivan, supra note 264, at 1127-45.
266. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378.
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grounded in the First and Fourth Amendments, and sound public policy
demand no less.
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Only prohibits non-wiretap recording of "confidential
communications," which excludes public gatherings,
legislative, judicial, or executive proceedings, and
communications where a party does not have an
expectation of privacy.
Any mechanical recording of non-telephonic or wire
conversations only requires one-party consent; visually
recording a person prohibited if person is "not in plain
State
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view" and has "reasonable expectation of privacy."
Interception of any conversation, defined as "oral
communication between 2 or more persons regardless of
whether one or more of the parties intended their
communication to be of a private nature under
circumstances justifying that expectation," is
punishable, §§ 5/14-1(d), -2(a)(1); "open meetings"
exception, § 5/14-3(e).
Interception is only prohibited for private conversations,
which Maryland courts have interpreted to require a
"reasonable expectation of privacy," § 10-401. See, e.g.,
Malpas v. Maryland, 695 A.2d 588 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1997).
Illegal interception only applies to secret recording or
eavesdropping.
Only illegal to audio intercept "private conversations," §
750.539d, or to visually intercept in a "private place,"
which is defined as any place where "one may
reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile
intrusion or surveillance but does not include a place to
which the public or substantial group of the public has
access," § 750.539a(1).
The law does not apply to: "(i) elected or appointed
public officials or to public employees when the
transcription or recording is done in the performance of
official duty;
(ii) persons speaking at public meetings;
(iii) persons given warning of the transcription or
recording, and if one person provides the warning, either
[Vol. 9540 FIRST AMENDMENT LA WREVIEW













party may record;" and only applies to "hidden"
recording.
One-party consent required for conversations
surreptitiously recorded; all-party consent for telephonic
or wiretapping; statute only applies to a "private
conversation," and persons "surreptitiously listening to,
monitoring or recording" the private conversations of
others, § 200.650.
The statute criminalizes (1) wiretapping by any third
party without consent of at least one party to a
telephonic or electronic communication; and (2)
recording any non-wire conversation without
specifically informing all participants in the
conversation; it is not illegal to record any
communication from inside one's home; the
prohibitions on recording do no apply at "[p]ublic or
semipublic meetings such as hearings before
governmental or quasi -governmental bodies, trials, press
conferences, public speeches, rallies, and sporting or
other events," § 165.540(6)(a);
"regularly scheduled classes or similar educational
activities in public or private institutions," §
165.540(6)(b); or during an "interview conducted by a
peace officer in a law enforcement facility" provided
that the recording device is not concealed, § 165.540(5).
Statute only protects "private" conversations; party
gains consent by announcing an intent to record in a
"reasonably effective manner," and also recording the
announcement.
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tit. 11, §§ 1335,
2401-2402 (2010))
Criminal penalties only extend to recording of "private
communication;" surreptitious visual observation or
photography is illegal only if the recorder is trespassing
on private property.
Persons acting under color of law are exempt from the
statute; telecommunications workers are directed to
cooperate with law enforcement officers seeking to
intercept wire or oral communications; criminal
penalties only extend to visual recording where person
taped:
(1) Is in a private area out of public view;
(2) Has a reasonable expectation of privacy; and
(3) Has not consented to the observation.
The statute may not be interpreted to "prevent a news
agency, or an employee thereof, from using the
accepted tools and equipment of that news medium in
the course of reporting or investigating a public and
newsworthy event," § 18-9-305(1).
Delaware's wiretap statute permits one-party consent
(allowing interception of "wire, oral or electronic
communication where the person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to the
interception, unless the communication is intercepted
for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious
act," § 2402(c)(4)), but the state's privacy law contains
an all-party provision (illegal to intercept "without the
consent of all parties thereto a message by telephone,





















§§ 21-4001 to -
4002 (2010))
privately, including private conversation, " §
1335(a)(4)).
It is only illegal to clandestinely record a "private
conversation" in a "private place," § 16-11-62(1);
private place is defined as "a place where one is
entitled reasonably to expect to be safe from casual or
hostile intrusion or surveillance," § 16-11-60(3); it is
also illegal to record with a hidden camera "without the
consent of all persons observed, to observe,
photograph, or record the activities of another which
occur in any private place and out of public view," §
16-11-62(2).
It is illegal to visually record any party in a "private
place."
Act only criminalizes wiretapping ("telephonic" or
"telegraphic" interception) where the recorder is
neither the "sender" or the "receiver" of the
communication, § 35-33.5-1-5.
The laws allow one-party consent; but a recorder "who
is openly present and participating in or listening to a
communication shall not be prohibited hereby from
recording such message or communication," § 727.8.
Intercepting any private communication is illegal;
criminal eavesdropping is defined as "[e]ntering into a
private place with intent to listen surreptitiously" or to
observe or record a private communication, § 21-4001;
installing a recording device in a private place where
sounds would not normally be audible to outsiders; and
visually recording any party in a state of undress when
the recorded party has a reasonable expectation of
2011] 543









§§ 2A:156A-2 to -4
(West 2011))
New Mexico











The statute prohibits prosecution if the recorder is
"within the range of normal unaided hearing," tit. 15, §
709(4)(B); it is a criminal violation of privacy to
visually record any person in a "private place," tit. 17,
§ 51 1(1)(B).
The statute does not apply to the recording of
communications that have "become common
knowledge or public information," § 2A: 156A-3.
The statute only applies to wiretapping ("tapping or
making any connection with any telegraph or telephone
line, wire, cable or instrument belonging to or in the
lawful possession or control of another, without the
consent" of the owner of the line).
Wiretapping is only illegal when a non-party to a
conversation taps the line of any party in the
communication; the statute also criminalizes
"mechanical overhearing of a conversation," § 250.05,
defined as "the intentional overhearing or recording of
a conversation or discussion, without the consent of at
least one party thereto, by a person not present thereat,"
§ 250.00(2).
There are no penalties for recording "any public oral
communication uttered at a public meeting," § 17-30-
15(2); the state's "peeping tom" statute forbids the use
of audio or video equipment for peeping "through
windows, doors, or other like places, on or about the
premises of another, for the purpose of spying upon or
invading the privacy of the persons spied upon," § 16-









tit. 13, § 2605 )
police, private detectives and "bona fide news
gathering activities," § 16-17-470(E)(5).
Third parties to conversations may not use an
"eavesdropping device" to record, however
eavesdropping devices do not include "[a]ny telephone
or telegraph instrument, equipment, or facility, or any
component thereof,... furnished to the subscriber or
user by a communications common carrier in the
ordinary course of its business and being used by the
subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its
business," § 23A-35A-1(6)(a); use of hidden cameras
is banned to record activity in "private places," defined
as places "where one may reasonably expect to be safe
from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance, but
does not include a place to which the public or a
substantial group thereof has access," § 22-1-2(33).
It is illegal to use a hidden video or audio recorder in a
''private place," which is defined as "a place where one
may reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile
intrusion or surveillance," § 76-9-401(1).
The Vermont Supreme Court has held that
nonconsensual surreptitious recording inside a home
violated the privacy provision of the state's
constitution. The court also stated that the constitution
cannot be invoked to protect areas or activities that
have been willingly exposed to the public. VT. CONST.
ch. 1, art. 11; Vermont v. Geraw, 795 A.2d 1219,
1221-22 (Vt. 2002).
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